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Globalization for Developmentl
Inward FDI and the Size of the Market
Akinori Tomohara
One of the recent policy
concerns in the area of
development is whether
globalization really helps to
improve standards of living in
developing countries.
International organizations
advocate the merit of
accessing the global economy
via foreign direct investment.
Anti-globalization movements
do not necessarily agree with
this view. Those opposing
globalization argue that selfinterested multinational
companies exploit the
resources of developing
countries and impair
development. Thus, for the
purpose of long run economic
growth, it may be better to
protect domestic infant
industries rather than rely on
foreign capital.
This article considers a
policy issue of whether
enlarged markets would result
from closer ties with foreignAkinori Tomohara, Ph.D., is an

assistant professor,
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owned multinational companies during the development
process. Whereas the gains
from free trade have been
thoroughly explored in the
trade literature, very few

spillovers to domestic
companies (Aitken, Harrison,
& Lipsey 1996; Feenstra &
Hanson 1997); however, as
Lipsey (2002) points out, little
attention has been given to the

proving the trade of
multinational companies is a
more effective growth engine
than the trade of domestic
companies. Recent empirical
literature (Levine & Renelt,
1992; Harrison, 1996;
Frankel & Romer, 1999)
shows a positive relationship
between trade and growth.
This relationship is not
sufficient, however, to
conclude that multinational
companies are advantageous.
Trade openness is enhanced
when domestic companies
increase their transactions
with foreign countries. The
possible gains from the
activities of multinational
affiliates in developing
countries have been explored
in the following two areas.
One is technology spillovers to
domestic companies (Haddad
& Harrison, 1993; Kokko,
1994; Aitken & Harrison,
1999; Blomstrom & Sjoholm,
1999). The other is wage

Investment, henceforth FDI,
on consumers in the literature.
This article relates two
branches of the literature:
trade openness and inward
FDI (i.e., the presence of
foreign affiliates in host
countries). The possible gains
of an open-door policy to the
markets in developing
countries by examining the
effects of inward FDI on
market size is investigated. For
this purpose, two alternative
industrial policies are
compared. One policy would
involve the promotion of a
domestic company. The
second policy would require
the hosting of a foreign-owned
multinational company.
The model falls among
those found in the standard
industrial organization
literature on the interrelated
markets (the seminal work of
Spengler, 1950; Greenhut &
Ohta, 1979; Tirole, 1988)
and the more recent ones that

attempts have been made at
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effects of Foreign Direct
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appear in the literature on the
taxation of multinational
companies (Horst, 1971;
Copithorne, 1971; Eden,
1985; Kant, 1990; Prusa,
1990; Gresik & Nelson,
1994; Stoughton & Talmor,
1994; Bond & Gresik, 1996).
Specifically, a theoretical
model is constructed by
referring to the recent tax
regulations concerning
multinational companies
(Elitzur & Mintz, 1996;
Tomohara, 2004).
Furthermore, the analysis
focuses on the vertical model
of a multinational company.
The knowledge-capital model
predicts the emergence of
vertically integrated
multinational companies when
countries differ in relative
factor endowments (Markusen
et al., 1996; Markusen,
1997; Carr, Markusen &
Maskus, 2001; Markusen &
Maskus, 2002; Blonigen,
Davies, & Head, 2003). Such
differences in relative factor

because a multinational
company tries to maximize its
global profits by exporting
more goods to the host
country. The multinational
company creates new demand
by providing goods at a lower
price than a domestic
company does, even if both
companies have the same cost
and production functions and,
thus, face the same demand
for the goods. The results of
the analysis complement the
previously recognized link
between trade openness and
economic growth. Furthermore, the results provide a
theoretical foundation for the
claim that an industrial policy
encouraging the presence of
foreign-owned multinational
companies will enlarge the
economy of host countries
through trade promotion. It is
concluded that industrial
policy tied with foreign-owned
multinational companies is a
potential catalyst for
enhancing the size of a

developing and developed
countries are often observed.
Analysis reveals the
possibility an open-door policy
will improve the welfare of
consumers through the
increased trade of
multinational companies. If
the markets between a
developed country and a
developing country are
interrelated through intra-firm
trade by multinational
companies, the developing
country's domestic market
becomes larger as the volume
of trade increases. This is

opportunities, and inducing
technology transfer. Therefore,
policies encouraging the
presence of foreign-owned
multinational companies are
effective engines of economic
growth.
The next section describes
a model for studying the
effects of two previously
mentioned industrial policies
on the size of the market in a
developing country. The
difference in trade patterns
under such policies clarifies
the mechanisms through
which trade by foreign

endowments between

6

domestic market, creating job
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multinational companies
enlarges the size of the
markets in comparison with
the trade of domestic
companies. Concluding
remarks offer directions for
future research.

Model
Consider the situation in
which governments in developing countries have two
alternative industrial policies
for the development of their
economies. One is protecting
their infant domestic industries and/or promoting stateowned companies. The other
is inducing foreign direct
investment and encouraging
the establishment of multinational companies in their
countries. The two different
market structures are
compared and the effects of
their different trade patterns
on domestic market size are
examined.
Foreign-Owned Multinational
Monopoly

The markets across two
countries are interrelated
through an intra-firm
transaction of a vertically
integrated multinational
company. The vertical model
is the knowledge-capital model
that predicts the emergence of
vertically integrated multinational companies when
countries differ in relative
factor endowments. The
knowledge-capital model
explains why the different
patterns of multinational
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companies evolve endogenously. Consider the
relationship between two
countries: a developing
country that hosts multinational companies and a
developed country where the
parents of multinational
companies are based. The
differences in relative factor
endowments between the two
countries are often observed.
The model says that
multinational activities are
motivated by the differences
in relative endowments since
vertically integrated multinational companies are likely
to emerge in order to exploit
the differences.
Trade within a firm is
modeled as a manufacturing
process from a parent factory
in an upstream location to
assembly factories located in
the destination market
(Helpman, 1984; Helpman &
Krugman, 1985). A typical
example is a parent company
in the developed country
producing and exporting
intermediate goods that are
further assembled or
manufactured by a subsidiary
in the developing country.
Final goods are sold in the
developing country's market.
Following the traditional
vertical integration literature,
the intra-firm transaction is
characterized to be a fixedcoefficient production function
(Greenhut & Ohta, 1979). Let
q > 0 be the quantity of the
intermediate goods produced
by the multinational parent in
the developed country, and Q
> 0 be the quantity of the

final goods processed by the
subsidiary in the developing
country. The production
function is Q = aq, where a
is a positive constant,
assuming that the amount of a
local input required for the
production is proportional to
q. We use the special case of a
= 1, as is commonly observed
in the transfer pricing
literature. With the proper
choice of units, one unit of the
intermediate goods is required
to produce one unit of the
final good.
The transfer price of the
intra-firm trade is regulated as
in the current tax system. The
transfer price is denoted as
constant mark-up rate k. The
mark-up is an advanced agreement among a multinational
company and two governments. It is determined as if
the intra-firm transaction took
place between non-associated
parties in the market. This is
so called the Bilateral
Advanced Pricing Agreement
(BAPA) case, in which tax
authorities in the two
countries agree to use the
same arm's length price so as
to eliminate the risk of double
taxation. Recent work in this
area (Elitzur & Mintz, 1996;
Tomohara, 2004) considers
the Advanced Pricing Agreement case using a similar (or
the same) analytical
framework. 1 In practice, the
mark up ratio is usually
decided by referring to market
conditions at the industry
level. The mark-up rate
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0 = (1 + k )ch

with a positive

guarantees that the positive
profits will be allocated to
each country under the
current tax system (where the
source of taxation rights relies
on national sovereignty).
The company is assumed
to have a monopoly on its
differentiated goods in the
host country. One interpretation of this assumption is that
the potential size of the
market is not large enough due
to the scale economy of the
industries. 2 Let the inverse
demand function for final
goods in the host market be
p = p(q), where p is the price
of the final goods. The price is
assumed to be continuous and
twice differentiable, strictly
monotonically decreasing, and
concave in the quantity of
output.
The factor markets are
characterized to be
competitive (either in the
developed or developing
country) because many local
companies provide nondifferentiated parts necessary
for production. A simple linear
cost function C; = c,q, where c;
is a positive constant marginal
cost in location i is used. The
location is denoted as i = h for
the developed country and i =

f for the developing country,

A multinational company
chooses output (which impacts
the volume of trade) to
maximize after-tax profits of
the group. Global profit
maximization is assumed, as is
typical in the literature,
though companies may have
multiple objectives and cou ld
possibly benefit from decen-

7

tralization . Each affiliate pays
corporate income taxes in its
resident country calculated at
a corporate tax rate t;, In
addition, a tariff is charged by
customs in the host country,
at a rate r, on the import of
the intermediate goods. The
after-tax global profits of the
mu ltinational company are
expressed as the sum of
profits earned in the two
countries:

(1 - 1)(0 - c)+
n=

[

(1 - , )

J

q

(1)

(p(q) - (i+r)0 - c)

The first-order condition
(which is also a sufficient
condition) provides the
fami liar, but slightly modified,
relationship with the after-tax
marginal revenue equated to
the after-tax marginal cost at
the group level:

(1 - 1,)(0 - c,) +
(1 - 1)

(2)

Domestic Monopoly

A domestic company
imports intermediate goods
from foreign companies in
developed countries and
manufactures them with nondifferentiated parts, which are
purchased from small-sized
domestic companies. Final
goods are sold at the

8

developing country's local
market, where the company
has a monopoly on its goods.
The manufacturing process
arises when the company does
not have the know-how to
produce intermediate goods.
This situation applies to many
developing countries, where
quality control does not work
at the local level. The lack of
quality control is due to the
unskilled labor force and high
costs of training local persons
on advanced technology
UETRO, 1997).
The domestic company has
the same technology structure
as the multinational company.
Consumers in the developing
country have the same
preferences for final goods
produced either by the domestic or multinational company.
These assumptions imply that
both the multinational and the
domestic companies produce
identical final goods and
eliminate the possibilities that
the different quality of final
goods affects the size of the
markets. In the model, the
strategic decision-making
about the quantity of output
(and, thus, the volume of
trade) is the only difference
between the multinational
company and the domestic
company. This simplification
allows for insight into the
impacts of two industrial
policies on the size of the
market by focusing on their

different trade patterns,

The after-tax profit of the
domestic company is a standard monopoly problem:

Fall 2004

TI=(I-t)
(p(q)-(1 + r)0- c,)q

(3)

The first-order condition
(which is also a sufficient
condition) provides the
familiar relationship of
marginal revenue equal to
marginal cost :
dp

-q+p(q)=
dq

(1 + 1' )0 + C

(4)

I

Globalization for
Development?
This section examines the
effects of an open-door
industrial policy on the size of
the markets in developing
countries. If the markets
between a developed country
and a developing country are
interrelated through the trade
of a multinational company,
comparison of the two cases
above reveals that the market
is enlarged via increased trade
volume. The result agrees with
the recognized linkage
between trade openness and
economic growth. In addition,
the result provides a
theoretical foundation for the
claim that international trade
initiated by multinational
companies has the potential to
improve the economic
performance of developing
countries.
Theorem : A foreign-owned
monopolistic
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multinational company
increases the size of
the market in the host
country to a greater
extent than would the
trade of a domestic
company with monopoly power.

When the markets
between a developed country
and a developing country are
interrelated through the trade
of a multinational company,
the size of the market in the
developing country is
enhanced through an increase
in the volume of trade across
the two countries. The reason
for this is the self-interest of
the multinational company.
The company tries to
maximize its global profits by
exporting more goods to the
host country. More formally,
maximizing global profits
requires a larger amount of
output than maximizing the
profit of an affiliate in the
host country. One can easily
understand the claim because
the profit in the home country
is monotonically increasing in
output (or the volume of
trade). On the other hand, as
established previously, the
condition of profit
maximization for the domestic
company is the same as profit
maximizing condition for the
multinational affiliate in the
host country. It is concluded
that, due to the presence of
the foreign multinational
company, the market expands

relative to its size when there
is only the domestic company.
An important point to note
is that a multinational
company enhances the size of
the market by providing the
same quality of goods at a
lower price than a domestic
company (see Figure). Thus,
the presence of multinational
companies creates new
demand for the goods in the
local markets of developing
countries. Consumers whose
reservation price was initially
below the price offered by the
domestic company, yet equal
to or above the price charged
by the multinational company,
are now able to purchase the
good. Such an increase in
demand may have a further
desirable impact on the
economy of these countries via
the multiplier effects of
consumption. This effect will
be larger than the model
predicts if more realistic
assumptions are introduced.
For example, multinational
companies have some
technological and management
advantages compared to
domestic companies and, thus,
can provide better quality of
products at lower prices.
One may wonder whether
the result is related to the
classic double marginalization
argument. Each unit of output
sold in the developing country
is produced from a unit of
input produced in the
developed country. The
domestic company imports
those inputs at the arm's
length price and operates as a

Southern Business Review
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Proof: Appendix.

monopolist in the market. It
seems possible that the result
in this article could be
interpreted as an efficiency
loss due to the monopoly
mark-up of the domestic
company; however, the
mechanism is not exactly the
same. The multinational
company in this model is also
segregated into two affiliates
under the current jurisdictional tax system. The
company purchases intermediate products at the same price
as the domestic company and
is not able to internalize the
cost of intra-firm transactions. 3 Rather, the cause of
the enlarged market is due to
the self-interest of multinational companies. Since the
multinational company is a
producer of the input (and the
output), producing and
exporting more intermediate
goods contributes to
maximizing its global profits.
This is not the case for the
domestic company.
Although the multinational
company is motivated to
export more goods, dumping is
not the cause of the enlarged
market in the developing
country. This is because tax
regulations (i.e., BAPA)
prevent the multinational
company from selling its goods
below the actual cost in the
current model. Remember how
the set-up of the mark-up ratio,
k. The enlarged market is
obtained solely from the selfinterest of the multinational
company maximizing global
profits. This argument will

9

Figure
Production Decisions of Companies
price

MR

quantity

q.,

MR : the marginal revenue of a domestic company
MCd : the margina l cost of a domestic company
MC,,, : the adjusted after-tax marginal cost of a multinational company*
q,1

the optimal level of the market for a domestic company

l/m :

the optimal level of the market for a multinational company

•The first-order condi tion of a multinational company:

(1 -1• )0 +(t - 11

{! )=
q+ p

(t - 1.)c• +(I-If )((l+r)O +cf).

After-tax marginal revenue = After-tax marginal cost.

To make the comparison easier, rearrange it as
dpq+p=( l +r)0+c

- p(iJ-c,.),

1
dq
Denote the right-hand side of the equation as
MCm =(I + r)0 + C_r - p(B - ch).

become clearer when dumping
is discussed.
One final remark is that
inward FDI is not a unique
solution. The analysis implies
that the size of the market in
developing countries will
increase when the markets
across host and home
countries are interrelated by
the intra-firm trade of
multinational companies .
Theoretically, outward FDI

10

where p=

could achieve the same goal. A
domestic company could
acquire a foreign input supplier and vertically integrate
its business backward;
however, this is seldom
observed in developing countries.
Applications

This section considers two
different scenarios . They are
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l -r•

J-11

> 0.

related to the issues of double
marginalization and dumping.
Although the two issues often
concern scholars, they are not
realistic given current tax and
trade regulations. In both
cases, either the developing
host country or the developed
country is not able to raise tax
revenue . This is because the
two scenarios do not allocate a
positive profit of the multinational company to both
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countries. Furthermore,
dumping is strictly regulated
under trade policy; however,
the following discussion
reveals that the result is not
specific to the situation in the
previous section and is still
valid in other cases.
Double marginalization.
Suppose a single supplier in an
upstream location produces
intermediate goods and sells
them to a single retailer in a
downstream location. The
retailer sells final goods. The
upstream supplier and the
downstream retailer each have
monopoly power. The price of
the final products includes
two successive mark-ups (or
marginalization). The supplier
charges a mark-up when
selling the intermediate goods
to the retailer and the retailer
charges another mark-up when
selling the final goods to
consumers. This is called
double marginalization. Once
the two companies integrate
their businesses vertically, the
mark-up charged by the
supplier disappears. A
vertically-integrated monopoly
enhances the size of the
market allows consumers to
purchase a larger quantity at a
lower price.
The story is about two
domestic companies; however,
it is possible to extend the
argument to the situation in
which two affiliates of a
multinational company reside
in different countries. The
upstream supplier corresponds
to the parent company in the
developed country and the
retailer in the downstream

location to the subsidiary in
the developing country. The
situation in which the mark-up
charged by the parent
disappears is modeled as
k = 0. After following a
similar discussion as in the
proof of Theorem, the
conclusion reached is the
multinational company regime
attains a larger market size in
the developing country than
the domestic company regime
(see Appendix). The result is
intuitive since k = 0 is the
special case of Theorem.
Dumping. "Under
international law, a firm is
dumping if it sells its product
abroad at a price below its
domestic price or below its
actual costs" (Carlton &
Perloff, 1994, p. 758). For
example, if the parent exports
the intermediate goods to the
subsidiary at $25,000 per
unit, but non-related parties
conduct a similar transaction
at $30,000 per unit (this is
called a comparable transaction), the multinational
company is said to be
dumping.
It is reasonable to believe
that dumping enhances the
size of the market in the
developing country. This is
because the subsidiary can
import the intermediate goods
at a lower cost; however, the
story is not so simple. It is
necessary to distinguish the
two cases. Denote the markup ratio when the multinational company is dumping
as kd. One is modeled as the
case, 0 < kd < k, and the
other is as the case, -1 < kd <

Southern Business Review
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0. In the former case, Theorem
derived in the previous section
is always valid (see Appendix},
but the latter case is slightly
complicated. Suppose the
parent company in the
developed country exports the
intermediate goods at a price
below marginal cost. The
output decision of the
company is affected by the
trade-off effect between the
gain from saving tariff
payment and the loss from the
decrease in the parent's profit.
Theorem is still valid, if the
corporate tax rate in the
developing country is lower
than the one in the developed
country. This is because,
roughly speaking, the gain and
loss are weighted by the two
tax rates respectively (see
Appendix). In reality, observed
corporate tax rates in
developing countries are much
lower than the ones in
developed countries (e.g.,
KPMG, 1998). Given the
current tax rates, hosting
multinational companies
would benefit developing
countries via enhanced market
size.
Market size and mark-up
ratio. Three cases are considered: BAPA (k > 0), vertical
integration (k = 0), and
dumping (0 < kd < k or -1 <
kd <0). The analysis shows
that, in all three cases, hosting
a multinational company
would yield greater benefit to
consumers in the developing
country than would promotion
of a domestic company. One
may wonder whether there is
any relationship between

11

market size and the mark-up
ratio, k. Suppose the
developing country levies a
lower tax rate than the
developed country. The size of
the market increases if the
multinational company
charges a lower transfer price.
The result shows that
companies use dumping as a
str;i tegv to incre,rne sales in
host countries.
Proposition. Suppose the
lilx rate in the developing
country, t1, is smaller than the
one in developed country, t 1,.
A larger market size, q, is
illtainecl with a lower mark-up
r;1tio, Ii.
Proof: Appendix.

Concluding Remarks
This article illustrates that
foreign direct investment by
multinational companies,
rather than protection of an
infant domestic company,
yields a larger market and,
therefore, fosters growth. The
analysis shows that, if the
markets between a developed
and a developing country are
interrelated through the intrafirm trade of a multinational
company, the size of the
domestic market exp;inds
through increased trade
volume because the multinatim1;il company tries to
maximize its global profits by
exporting more goods to the
developing country. Therefore,
the multinational company can
provide final goods to local

12

consumers at a lower price
than the domestic company.
This creates new demand for
the goods in the local markets.
These results are also valid in
other scenarios.
The current analysis
provides a theoretical
foundation to the
multinational enterprise
(MNE) network hypothesis.
The MNE hypothesis claims
that "increasing imported
inputs arc related to growing
inward FDI; higher input
imports would result from
intense trading between
MNE's affiliates in foreign
countries and (parent)
companies of the home
country" (OECD, 2002,
p.80). This article extends the
idea and shows that higher
input imports by multinational
companies have the potential
to enhance the host markets.
This will benefit local
consumers in developing
countries.
The analytical framework
is applicable to other
interesting but more
complicated situations. One
possible extension is to
examine the impacts of the
two industrial policies on
profits and tax revenues.
Sizable tax revenues arc often
needed to finance social
policies in developing
countries, where large-scale
companies play a dominant
role in the economy. Raising
tax revenues is an important
policy concern of governments
in those countries. Other
possible extensions are to
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include exchange rates and
foreign tax credits and
deductions. Although this
requires appropriate modifications to the model, the main
conclusion in this article will
still hold. The literature such
as Baccetta and Wincoop
(2000) reports a weak linkage
between exchange rate
stability and trade. One last
extension is to examine the
relevance of the analysis using
data. An index of ownershipweighted trade openness into
the models of previous
empirical literatures on ,J
relationship between trade and
growth should be introduced.
It could be obtained by taking
the ratio of the amount of
trade conducted by multinational companies to the
amount of trade in the
country. Then, trade openness
could be multiplied by the
ratio. All of these topics
represent potential future lines
of research.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem
The result is easily obtained by comparing (2) and (4) as in Figure. First, denote the marginal
revenue of the domestic company MR(=

! q + p(q)) and the marginal cost MCd (= (1 + r)0 + c1 ). The

optimal level of the market qd is decided at the point, where MR is equated to MC . Next, to make
the comparison easier, rearrange (2) as
dp
1-t
-q+p=(l+r)0+c1 -p(0 - ch), where p=--h >0
(5).
dq
1-t f
The last inequality is obtained from the assumption 1 > I; > 0, where i E (h,f). Denote the right-

hand side of the equation as MCm (= (I + r )0 + c1 - p(0 - ch)) and the optimal level of the market when a

foreign multinational company dominates the market as qm. With these notations, qm is decided at
the point, where MR is equated to MCm. Finally, the relationship qm > qd is true once we show that
the difference between MCd and MCm is positive, i.e., p(B -ch)> 0 . The inequality is always
satisfied from the assumption, 0 - ch = kch > 0 . ///

Proof of the Statement in Double Marginalization
Substitute k = 0 into MCm in the proof of Theorem. This makes MCm to MC:;;' =(I+ r)ch + cI that
is smaller than MCd • I I I
Proof of the Statement in Dumping
Denote the right hand side of Equation (5) as MC; =(I+ r)(l + kd )ch +cf - pkdch, when the
multinational company is dumping. Once we demonstrate that the inequality, MC! - MCd < 0, holds,
the proof is done. If O< kd < k , MC~ - MCd is always negative since the difference is expressed as

(o + r)(kd -k)- pkd )ch .///

Show if 0<t1 < t,.,then MC~ - MCd<O for all kd such as -l<kd<O. Suppose MC~-MCd ~ O for
some kd, then kd

1-

(pk
) . This implies (1 + r) < p from k > 0. However, 0 < t 1 < th implies
/(l+r)

(0 <)p < 1. Contradiction.///

Southern Business Review

Fall 2004

15

Proof of Proposition
From Figure, a larger output is attained with a smaller MCm. If a smaller mark-up ratio reduces
MC,;, , then the proof is done. Differentiating MCm with respect to k gives (1 +. - p
This is always
positive since O< t 1 < th implies (0 <)p < I .II I

h.

16

Fall 2004

Southern Business Review

